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tion of the subcontractors' problem is better obtained by adhering to ac-
cepted contract principles, rather than by creating an additional exception
in favor of subcontractors.67 A revolutionary attempt at administrative
control of the Government contract need only be considered as a possible
alternative if the courts refuse to adopt this new outlook.
NONFEASANCE: A THREAT TO THE PROSECUTORS'
DISCRETION
It is generally conceded that punishment for the commission of a
criminal act is an effective means' of reducing the steadily increasing
crime rate in the United States.2 Under present criminal law standards,
however, there can be no punishment until there has been legal prosecution
and conviction.' Thus, the prosecution of criminal offenses becomes a
pivotal point in all attempts to reduce crime.
67. Two possible methods exist of overcoming the favorable exceptions granted to
the Government. One is to utilize another exception to counteract the first; second is to
neutralize the exception by adhering to general contract law. See notes 61 and 65 supra
and text.
1. "Punishment should be inflicted, firstly, because it is right to do so. But such
punishment may also have very useful effects: it may stimulate reformation by bringing
a wrongdoer to a realization of the ethical significance of his behavior; it may also deter.
Such punishment provides far-ranging instruction in the social values." HALL, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 130 (1947). See also Ewing, A Study on Punishment, 21 CAN. B. REv.
102, 116 (1943) ; Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penwl Code, 11 Wis. L. REv.
346, 353 (1936) ; Note, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MOD. L. REv. 205 (1944).
The modern proponent of deterministic behaviorism is likely to object to punishment
of any sort, preferring the view that society, and not the violator of the law, is the sinner
or that the criminal is sick and should be treated accordingly. See MENNINGER, THE
HUMAN MIND (1945); WHITE, CRIME AND CRIMINALS (1933).
2. In 1952, crime in cities increased 8.1 percent, showing gains in all offenses for
the first time in seven years. This was a general rise in crime of 8.2 percent over the
1951 figures. 23 UNIF. CR. REP. 71 (1952). The first six months of 1953 showed a 2.5
percent increase over the same period in the preceding years and a 9.0 percent increase
over that period of 1951. 24 UNIF. CR. REP. 1 (1953). Since 1950, there has been a 20
percent increase in the crime rate in contrast with a population rise of only 6 percent.
The Indianapolis Star, April 22, 1954, p. 20, col. 1.
Prior to 1951, the crime problem in the United States was serious enough to warrant
national attention. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951).
3. This idea is embodied in what Professor Hall calls the "principle of legality" and
defines as the "limitation on penalization by officials, effected by the required prescrip-
tion and application of specific rules." HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (1947).
The principle, which springs from an ultimate concept of justice, expresses itself in the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The general process of prosecution embraces the activities of several law enforce-
ment agencies; i.e., police, prosecutor, jury, and judge. Traditionally, the initial charge
against an alleged offender is made by the police, and, then, carried to the prosecutor or
the grand jury. In most jurisdictions either of these agencies may institute prosecution
NOTES 75
Presently, varying degrees of discretion are exercised by the four
agencies entrusted with prosecution of alleged criminal offenders, police,
prosecutor, jury and judge; but of particular importance is that accorded
the policeman and prosecutor. The policeman exercises discretion in de-
ciding whether or not to arrest a person who has committed a minor vio-
lation of the criminal law.4 The public is generally aware of this practice
and grants tacit approval. When a formal complaint is signed by the
policeman, the prosecutor utilizes discretion in determining whether or
not the alleged offender will be indicted and tried for commission of the
act.5 Thus, the discretion granted the prosecutor is immensely larger in
against the alleged offender. Formal charge by the grand jury takes the form of an
indictment, and was originally the only way of initiating a criminal proceeding. Today,
however, the information filed by the prosecutor is widely used, 1 Bisnop, NEW CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §144 (1913), although commonly limited in application. Rule 7(a), FED. R.
CRIm. P., forbids use of an information for any capital offense but permits its utilization
for offenses the punishment for which exceeds one year if indictment is waived by the
offender. In Indiana, the affidavit is substituted for the information and is substantially
similar to that instrument. IND. ANN. STAT. §9-908 (Burns Repl. 1942).
A recent decision, which will necessarily be limited in use, permitted a conviction up-
on an affidavit submitted by the defendant and accompanied by his plea of guilty. People
v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E.2d 613 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 864 (1952). This
case was commented on in 66 HARv. L. IEv. 360 (1952).
4. This fact is recognized in various works concerning criminal prosecutions. After
recognizing a certain operation of discretion throughout the administration of criminal
law, Dean Pound says simply: "The police exercise a certain discretion as to who shall
be brought before the tribunals." FOUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 41 (1930).
Professor Hall echoes these sentiments when applied to minor offenses. Hall, Police and
Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 149 (1953), despite suggesting th4t the
police have a duty to arrest upon reasonable grounds. Id. at 155.
The Indiana statute prescribing the duty of a peace officer to arrest uses permissive,
rather than mandatory language. IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1024 (Bums Repl. 1942). How-
ever, this provision has been interpreted, in a dictum, as not affecting the common law
duties of a policeman; the common law required that an officer arrest for a crime which
he observes and prevent a crime which he anticipates. Hopewell v. State, 22 Ind. App.
489, 493, 54 N.E. 127, 129 (1899). There is another dictum which supports the proposi-
tion that a policeman has a duty to arrest all persons who violate the law. People v.
Glennon, 37 Misc. 1, - , 74 N.Y. Supp. 794, 799-800 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
5. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. Ill. 1945); State ex rel.
Spencer v. Criminal Court, 214 Ind. 551, 556, 15 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (1938); State ex rel.
Gebrink v. Hospers, 147 Iowa 712, - , 126 N.W. 818, 819 (1910) ; State ex rel. Bourg
v. Marrero, 132 La. 110, 139, 61 So. 136, 147 (1913) ; Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40
A.2d 319, 321 (1944) ; Engle v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 525 (1883) ; State ex tel McKit-
trick v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 322, 182 S.W.2d 313, 319 (1944) ; Jones v. District Court,
67 Nev. 404, 410-411, 219 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1950).
See also 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW §718 (1914); Curran, A Federal Prose-
cutor Looks at the New Federal Criminal Rides, 13 J. OF DIST. COL. B. A. 3 (1946);
Glueck, The Place of Proper Police and Prosecutory Work in a Crime Reduction Pro-
gram in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON GRIME 52, 60 (1934) ;
Snyder, The District Attorney's Hardest Task, 30 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 180
(1940).
The only limitation generally imposed upon the prosecutor's exercise of discretion is
that it not be exercised with corrupt intent. E.g., Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 463, 198
S.W. 113, 115 (1917) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Ellis, 184 Ind. 307, 312, 112 N.E. 98, 100
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scope than that of the policeman; for if the prosecutor does not act, the
judge and jury are helpless, and the policeman's work is meaningless. The
prosecutor further dominates the administration of criminal law since he
may dismiss or nolle prosequi with the court's approval at any time prior
to the verdict.6
Implied in all grants of discretion is the desire that the laws be applied
according to the circumstances of each case, for the use of discretion neces-
sarily denies the advisability of prosecuting every violation of the law.7
Probably the most convincing argument in support of a policy granting
discretion in enforcement of the criminal law is that it provides for the
elimination of charges which cannot be proved in court, thus saving time
and expense for more sound cases.' It is also important when dealing
with violations of a statute which exists chiefly for its deterrence value
because the social importance of the prohibited act, or the amount of
(1915) ; State ex rel. Gebrink v. Hospers, supra; State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wallach,
supra; 1 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW §460 (9th ed. 1923) ; THORNTON, loc. cit. supra; contra,
State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 Atl. 162 (1916), aff'd, 90 N.J.L. 507, 101 Atl. 569
(1917) ; State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953), motion for stay denied, 27 N.J.
Super. 120, 98 A.2d 898 (1953), order denying bill of particulars aff'd, 27 N.J. Super. 304,
99 A.2d 368 (1953). New Jersey has taken a unique position regarding this rule. See
note 55 infra and accompanying text.
6. Originally, most jurisdictions permitted the prosecuting attorney to exercise the
common law power of the Attorney General of England. His power to dismiss was
unlimited prior to the trial. Also, before judgment but after the return of the verdict,
the prosecutor could nolle prosequi. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101-102
(S.D. II. 1945). Statutes, however, have altered the common law on this matter. One
of the most common limitations upon the power of nolle prosequi is to require the consent
of the court. FED. R. CRIm. P. 48(a) ; GA. CODE ANN. §27-1801 (1953) ; IOWA CODE ANN.
c.36, §795.5 (1946); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-9505 (1947); N.Y. CRIM. CODE §671;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §492 (1930). Some of the preceding statutes ostensibly abolish
nolle prosequi, permitting the court to dismiss upon its own motion as well as upon the
motion of the prosecuting attorney. The important thing is that the court's permission
is necessary to a dismissal of charges in these states. A helpful and relatively compre-
hensive discussion of nolle prosequi and its application in various jurisdictions may be
found in People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomber, 284 Ill. 315, 120 N.E. 244 (1918). Addi-
tionally, the prosecutor may waive important issues in the prosecution, such as stipulating
that the defendant was insane at the time the act was committed. Commonwealth v.
Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 Atl. 454 (1935).
7. Dean Pound suggests that discretion versus strict enforcement of the laws is one
of the eternal jurisprudential arguments. POUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 40-54.
8. Few, if any, of the authorities even consider this point, for it appears self-evident.
If the prosecutor were forced to act upon every charge, however, the issue would assume
importance. See Baker, The Prosecutor: Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771, 772 (1933) ; Glueck, supra note 5, at 60; Miller, The Compromise of
Criminal Cases, 1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1, 31 (1927).
An unrepresentative survey showed that sixty-eight of seventy-three downstate
Illinois prosecuting attorneys thought that they could prepare their cases as well as the
defense. ILLINOIS ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 267-268 (1929).
This statement can be made only after many charges have been shelved by the exercise
of the prosecutor's discretion.
NOTES
harm resulting from it, may have changed since the statute was passed.'
Discretion can tailor the enforcement of such a statute to the particular
necessities of the community. 0 Under these circumstances, it fills the
gap between morality and mores, catering generally to mores and violat-
ing morality where the two conflict." A further advantage of the ex-
ercise of discretion in criminal prosecutions is its use as a counterbalance
against the presumption that all laws are known.' When it is believed
that no further violations will be committed by the alleged offender and
the nature of the crime is such that the prescribed sanction seems un-
warranted under the circumstances, refusal to prosecute saves the com-
munity unnecessary expense and animosity.' Discretion also enables a
budgeting of time and energy so that the issues of the moment may be
9. Many statutes are passed to provide sanctions for conduct which arouse the ire
of the particular generation yet do not so affect succeeding generations; and the harm
resulting from the prohibited act may lose its seriousness as time passes. This suggests
that the sanction should be changed, even though the law is still recognized as somewhat
efficacious. Nevertheless, the law is permitted to remain through a combination of
inertia and a desire to retain the sanction as a deterrent to the act which, though not
warranting the punishment provided in the statute, is sought to be discouraged, e.g., blue
laws.
10. "Necessities" is the word chosen here rather than "desires" because the desires
of the community may have a detrimental effect on other communities or submit the
minority to lawlessness by a gentleman's agreement not to prosecute a certain type of
offense. The courts have condemned prosecutors who permit the desires of the com-
munity to decide what offenses they should prosecute. "The duties of state's attorneys
are to be performed regardless of public sentiment, and he who administers that office
in deference to sentiment opposed to the law is unfit to hold that office or to be an at-
torney at law." In re Voss, 11 N.D. 540, 546, 90 N.W. 15, 18-19 (1902).
11. Proponents of the view that the law should represent all morality will consider
this fact a disadvantage to discretion rather than an advantage since the prosecutor will
tend to choose the alternative of not prosecuting a law which represents morality rather
than mores. A rebuttal to the moralist's position is that not all violations of the moral
code are meant to be punished by temporal society, especially those which are secretive
or personal in nature. Furthermore, there is insufficient agreement concerning moral
codes to satisfy each particular school of thought and yet draft a workable law. The
disagreement between morality and mores is factual rather than theoretical, however, as-
suming that morality is the acme of conduct and mores are man's attempts to achieve
morality. Unfortunately, man does not always attempt to achieve morality.
12. This presumption is both a matter of convenience and a matter of policy. It
fixes on the citizen the duty to ascertain the law, and, once this duty is imposed on him,
he must govern his conduct accordingly. The presumption is made irrebuttable to avoid
placing a premium on ignorance of the law. Avoiding criticism of the means whereby
a new law is promulgated, the sheer bulk of the law today imposing criminal sanctions
defies knowledge by any individual. Of course, the major offenses are known to all
ordinary persons, and these are not considered here; however, the many, many minor
laws cannot be fully known. One has only his conscience to guide him in respect to them.
What is here proposed is that the prosecutor weigh all these facts before he institutes an
action for such an offense, even though the violation is clear.
13. One might call this a form of economy of punishment as that concept is recog-
nized. See Snyder, siujfra note 5, at 173.
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dealt with quickly, while temporarily laying aside less important
violations.14
While the use of discretion offers many advantages to intelligent
enforcement of criminal laws, it also entails many disadvantages. Pri-
marily, it centralizes most of the power of local criminal law enforcement
in one office and vests that office with a wide choice of action. 5 If
this freedom of action is granted to an elected official, political aspirants
and tacticians are attracted to the position. Thus, the office can become
both a stepping stone to greater things and a powerful weapon in party
machinations.' 6 Flowing from the political nature of the office is the
necessity of keeping one's self continually before the eyes of the electors."
This, however, is more an asset to prosecution than a detriment because
of the desire to put before the voting public a good record of prosecu-
tions."8 Regrettably, even this can have a detrimental effect on prosecu-
tion since there is a temptation to waive felonies and permit pleas of
guilty to lesser offenses in order to establish a good record of convic-
tions.' 9 In weighing the advantages of permitting discretion in the
process of enforcing criminal laws against the disadvantages of doing
so, the grant of discretion appears to be more ,desirable. Sanctions may
14. This statement embodies a facet of the money and time saving rationale dis-
cussed in note 8, and accompanying text, supra. One distinction may be made: in the
previous case the sufficiency of evidence was of primary concern; in this instance, the
sufficiency of the evidence is assumed, and the issue is the timeliness of the action. There
are occasions when a particular offense or type of violation breaks out and spreads like
a plague. When such a crisis occurs, a prosecutor saddled with numerous prior violations
to prosecute is helpless to stem the trend.
15. "Few assemblies of men and government are entrusted with more power-with
less accountability-than the prosecutor, for he has more power over life, liberty and
reputation than any other person in America." Curran, note 5 supra, at 3. See MOLEY,
POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 48-49 (1929).
16. 76 A.B.A. REP. 401-402 (1951) contains an excellent critique of this situation.
Similar comment is abundant. As the authorities point out, the underlying problem is
that this marriage of prosecutor to politics too often begets crime as its offspring. POUND,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 183-184; ILL. ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 8, at
251, 330; MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at c.4.
One of the most recent works of this nature does not single out the prosecutor for
politico-criminal association but discusses the extensive scope of politico-criminal con-
nections in general. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951). See Glueck, supra note 5,
at 60.
17. The end result of this desire often raises a conflict between the various law
enforcement agencies who compete for publicity. Hobbes, Prosecutor's Bias: An Occu-
pational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv. 40, 44 (1949).
18. POUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 183-184.
19. For instance, an estimated seventy-five percent of the findings of guilt in Cook
County, Illinois, were of something less than the original charge. ILL. ASS'N FOR CIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 260. Other comments on this practice may be found
in MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 167; POUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 183-184; Baker,
supra note 8, at 788; Miller, supra note 8. The article by Dean Miller treats many legiti-
mate uses of the compromise and suggests that it might profitably be extended still more.
NOTES
be provided against improper exercises of discretion, but where it is denied
completely, nothing can be substituted for the advantages it affords.
Admitting the advisability of utilizing discretion in law enforcement,
it becomes necessary to decide which of the four agencies involved in the
process of prosecution may best exercise it. Should this power be lodged
in the policeman, perhaps the disadvantages which arise from political
demands could be avoided, but others would ensue. If the policeman had
a general, recognized discretion, his decisions would have to be made
soon after the offender was apprehended; thus, he would not have the
opportunity to weigh important interests which might not be immediately
apparent. Again, because of the nature of his position, the policeman is
the first to deal with the problem, and if he exercised discretion, he would
act without the benefit of another's opinion. Even if discretion were ex-
ercised some time after the arrest, the characteristics of the average
policeman belie the ability to make as qualified a judgment as the prose-
cutor, 'for his daily association with the people and his proximity to all
phases of their lives tend to make him more emotionally impressionable.2"
Finally, the average policeman cannot be expected to possess the education
required of lawyers. Presumably, superior education contributes to one's
ability to make proper judgments.
Without considering the factual possibility that the grand jury does
exercise general discretion, if this power be officially given it,"' many of
the disadvantages posited in the case of the policeman would also be
present in that of the jury. The additional disadvantage of placing a
vital portion of the law enforcement scheme in the hands of laymen, who
cannot be as aware of the inherent, peculiar problems as the professional
man, would also ensue. These arguments apply equally to grand and
petit juries.
Realistically, the only possible contenders for the grant of discretion
are the judge and the prosecutor. The judge's professional qualifications
20. See Hall, supra note 4, at 146-161. Also, other sources strongly indicate that
the policeman is relatively easy to corrupt. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA 14-15 (1951);
76 A.B.A. REP. 400-401 (1951).
21. See PouND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 41, 187. The function of the grand jury is
not to determine whether or not there shall be a prosecution in this instance, but whether
or not the facts shown and the evidence presented indicate that there is reasonable prob-
ability that an offense has been committed by the defendant. Admittedly, this point is
subject to the argument that a discretion similar to the prosecuting attorney's may be
exercised by the grand jury, but this does not coincide with the oaths generally required
of grand jurors. See IND. ANN. STAT. §9-807 (Burns 1933) for the form of a typical
oath. See also Miller, Information or Indictment in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REv. 379,
381 (1924) ; Thompson, Shall the Grand Jury in Ordinary Criminal Cases Be Dispensed
with in Minnesota?, 6 MINN. L. REv. 615-616 (1922) ; Note, The Grand Jury: Its Inves-
tigatory Powers and Limitations, 37 MINN. L. REv. 586, 587 (1953).
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usually equal or surpass the prosecutor's, and where the judgeship is
appointive instead of elective, political pressures do not influence the
judge as much as they do the prosecutor. However, the exercise of
discretion by the judge would assume the nature of an informal trial, and
if the accused were submitted to prosecution by the judge's initial decision,
the outcome of the trial might well be predicted. No objection could be
made to the judge's exercise of discretion if he decided not to prosecute,
because he is quite as capable as the prosecutor to weigh all the circum-
stances involved; but where he submits the accused to prosecution, a certain
prejudice in favor of his first judgment might occur. It is manifestly
desirable to separate the trier of the social consequences from the de-
terminer of the law. Even if the judge concluded that prosecution would
be inadvisable, the time necessary to make such a decision would seriously
hinder the fulfillment of his other duties. At present, he does exercise
discretion in sentencing, and this is somewhat analogous to the prosecutor's
weighing of the circumstances when he decides whether or not to prose-
cute.2 If both powers were centered in the judge, they would lose what-
ever efficacy they have as checks upon each other.
The prosecuting attorney, on the other hand, is exceedingly well-
suited to exercise discretion in criminal prosecutions. He is educated,
both generally and in the law."3 Since his office is elective, he must
always be sensitive to the needs and desires of the community.2" Finally,
the prosecutor should be a specialist in trial work and more capable than
any of the other agencies, except perhaps the judge, to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence. As a result of these factors, permitting the
prosecutor to exercise general discretion while limiting that exercised by
the dther law enforcement agencies seems to be the most satisfactory
system available.
Although it is generally conceded that the prosecutor should exercise
discretion in carrying out the duties of his office, the limits of this
responsibility are not clearly drawn. 5 State constitutions and statutes
usually specify a general duty to prosecute, but seldom go further in
22. MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 44-45; POUND, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 41.
23. Indiana is one of the several states which still do not require its prosecuting
attorneys to be members of the bar.
24. But see note 16 supra.
25. "In spite of the fact that the major portion of this material [statutes requiring
the prosecutor to prosecute specific offenses] sets forth the relation of the prosecutor to
the initiation of prosecution, the enactments of the legislature do not define clearly the
general duty of the prosecuting attorney to institute criminal proceedings when he has
knowledge of a crime." Baker and DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney: Powers and
Duties in Criminhal Prosecutions, 24 J. OF CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1025, 1055 (1934).
NOTES
guiding the prosecutor in his official actions. 6 Consequently, he must
look to the courts for guidance, though they require only that his discre-
tion not be exercised with corrupt intent." Some statutes, however, do
impose upon the prosecutor an absolute duty to prosecute certain viola-
ions upon reasonable charge being made.28 None, except antilynching
statutes in two states,2" concern themselves with felonies, and most are of
the type generally described as malum prohibitum, viz., statutes pertain-
ing to gambling,"° liquor,"' agricultural products, 2 taxes,8" health,"' and
economic regulations. 3 Such laws are obviously ministerial in nature
and not discretionary ;6 therefore, mandamus would lie to compel their
enforcement. However, a substantial issue presented by these statutes is
whether the prosecutor or the court is the arbiter of the reasonableness of
26. E.g., A~Iz. CODE ANN. §17-902 (1939); FLA. STAT. §34.12 (1951); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §31-2604 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 126, §.053 (1953) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§49-2501,
49-2503 (Burns 1933); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 10, §34 (Cum. Supp. 1951);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §56.060 (Vernon's 1949) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §23-1201 (1943) ; OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. §309.08 (Pages Rev. 1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §3431 (1930) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. §9966 (Williams 1934) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §371 (1949).
27. See note 5 supra.
28. See Baker and DeLong, supra note 25. Inherent in this demand is the problem
of investigation by the prosecuting attorney, especially of the matters with which these
statutes deal. Ibid.
29. S.C. CODE §16-59.2 (Supp. 1952) ; VA. CODE §18-39 (1950).
30. Anic. STAT. ANN. §84-2723 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-3808 (1947); MONT.
Rtv. CODES ANN. §94-2414 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-2205 (West 1941); S.D. CODE
§24.0206 (1939).
31. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 29, §117 (1940); KAN. GEN. STAT. §41-1107 (1949) ; ME.
REV. STAT. c.57, §79 (1944) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §340.38 (1945) ; N.D. REv. CODE §5-0115
(1943) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §92 (1951) ; VT. RIv. STAT. §6173 (1947).
32. E.g., DELA. REv. CODE c. 3, §1508 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. §15-810 (Burns
1933); Ky. REv. STAT. §217.270 (Supp. 1953); Miss. CODE ANN. §4411 (1942); N.Y.
AGRICTrLTUnE AND MAtxmas LAWS §172d; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §1106 (1946); R. I.
GEN. LAWS c. 5, §65 (1938).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. §1380 (Williams 1934).
34. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §217.130 (Supp. 1953); ME. REv. STAT. c. 27, §67 (1944);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §33.19 (West 1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §7129 (1942); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §196.035 (Vernon 1949); NJ. REv. STAT. §24:18-10 (1937); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, §355 (1951); S.C. CODE §32-1757 (1952).
35. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §80.22 (West 1945) ; N. . RE V. STAT. §59-507 (1943);
NEV. Comp. LAWS §747.82 (Supp. 1941); S.C. CODE §66-69 (Supp. 1952); UTAH CODE
ANN. §61-1-27 (1953).
36. The wording of the statutes explicitly places the duty to prosecute upon the
prosecutor. By thus depriving him of discretion, they make his duties ministerial. Brack
v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 89-90, 40 A2d 319, 321 (1944).
37. Mandamus lies to force an official to do a duty which is purely ministerial in
nature. Cf. Brack v. Wells, supra note 36; Murphy v. Summers, 54 Tex. Cr. 369, -,
112 S.W. 1070, 1071 (1908).
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the charge." The most likely interpretation is that the prosecutor makes
this determination at his peril, having to answer to the court if the issue
is contested.39 Some statutes avoid this problem by authorizing an ad-
ministrative board to make the final decision concerning the reasonable-
ness of the charge." When the board concludes that this has been done,
the prosecutor must proceed.4" Statutes explicitly requiring prosecution
render nolle prosequi unavailable to the prosecutor, for if he could enter
this after initiating prosecution, the mandatory nature of the statute
would become a farce.42
When enforcing criminal statutes which do not require mandatory
prosecution, various sanctions protect the public against abuse of the
prosecutor's discretion. Logically, the means to be used depends upon
the extent of the duty to prosecute and the remedy desired by the one
invoking it. If actual prosecution be desired, mandamus would appear
to be most appropriate, but this writ is not available for an official action
which requires the exercise of discretion. 3 In addition, the practicability
of mandamus as a remedy in situations necessitating a succession of acts
requiring continual professional decisions, as in a criminal prosecution,
may well be questioned.4"
38. The grand jury might perform this function if the statutes be interpreted to
mean that the prosecutor must act only if an indictment is returned. See Baker and
DeLong, supra note 25, at 1055. Such an interpretation perverts the natural meaning of
the statutes, however, since they generally state that the prosecutor must enforce this
law or must act when a reasonable charge has been made. In view of the fact that the
information is available in nearly all states for all charges except those involving capital
punishment and that the mandatory statutes deal with nonfelonious offenses, it would
not seem that the grand jury was meant to be the judge of the reasonableness of the
charge. However, see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
39. Cf. Speer v. State, 130 Ark., 457, 461-462, 198 S.W. 113, 115 (1917) ; Kittler v.
Kelsh, 56 N.D. 227, 232, 216 N.W. 898, 900 (1927) ; State ex. rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 11
N.D. 136, 145, 90 N.W. 564, 568-569 (1902).
40. A typical statute of this nature is the following: "It shall be the duty of each
Commonwealth's attorney to whom the Board of Pharmacy shall report any violation of
this chapter to cause appropriate proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted without
delay, for the enforcement of the penalties as in such case provided, and to prosecute
appeals under §54-432.2." VA. CODE §54.523 (1950) ; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 45, §.042
(1953); NEB. REv. STAT. §81-332 (1943); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §1295 (1946); Wyo.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §54-312 (1945).
41. The prosecutor need not, however, abstain from prosecuting until the board acts,
for he has a sworn duty to prosecute criminal violations. State v. Loesch, 237 N.C. 611,
75 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
42. But see Baker and DeLong, supra note 25, at 1061.
43. See note 36 supra.
44. Cf. Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944).
NOTES
When a prosecutor's actions constitute misconduct in office, i.e.,
malfeasance,4 misfeasance," or nonfeasance,"7 he is subject to disbarment,
impeachment, or indictment.48 Although impeachment and indictment are
available only to punish misconduct done in an official capacity, disbar-
ment is a more unrestricted sanction.4" It is a general policing tool to
protect the integrity of the court.5" However, since a disbarred attorney
cannot practice, the fact that the prosecutor's actions might be cause for
disbarment must necessarily influence his decisions. This device has
been used to remove a prosecuting attorney from office under statutes
requiring him to be a member of the bar, and employed thus, it can be a
substitute for impeachment. 5
Some state constitutions and statutes specifically provide for the
impeachment of various public officials, including the prosecuting attor-
ney. 2 While the court is usually entrusted with the power to remove the
prosecutor from office, in several jurisdictions the governor may perform
this function."
One method of disciplining official misconduct deserves particular
attention because it involves imprisonment and fine as well as removal
from office. Misconduct in office is an indictable misdemeanor in some
45. Malfeasance by an officer is the doing of an illegal act concerning his official
duties. State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308, 309-310, 170 N.W. 201, 203
(1918) ; State v. Miller, 32 Wash.2d 149, 152, 201 P.2d 136, 138 (1947) ; State ex rel.
Knabb v. Frater, 198 Wash. 675, 680, 89 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1939). Commonwealth v.
Mecleary, 147 Pa.Super. 9, 24, 23 A.2d 224, 230 (1941), further requires concurrence of
corrupt intent or bad faith and the doing of the act.
46. Misfeasance by an officer is doing in a wrongful manner that which he is
legally authorized or required to do. Holmes v. Osborn, 57 Ariz. 522, 540, 115 P.2d 775,
783 (1941) ; Stark Hickey, Inc. v. Standard Acc. Inc. Co., 291 Mich. 350, 357, 289 N.W.
172, 175 (1939) ; Robinson v. Ocean Township, 123 N.J.L. 525, 527, 9 A.2d 300, 301 (1939).
47. Nonfeasance in office is the failure to do that which one has a duty to perform.
Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 375, 31 A.2d 414, 416 (1943) ; Buckingham v. Fifth Judi-
cial District Court, 60 Nev. 129, 136, 102 P.2d 632, 635 (1940).
48. Of course, he is not subject to all three sanctions in every state for any act of
misconduct. 1 BuRmcic, LAW OF CRIME §§272, 272a (1946).
49. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) ; Moore v. Strickling, 46 W.Va. 515, 33 S.E.
274 (1899) ; 15 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 217 (1947).
50. E.g., Ex parte Wall, supra note 49; Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.
Ky. 1947) ; In re Sanitary District Attorneys, 351 Ill. 206, 184 N.E. 332 (1933) ; Common-
wealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W.2d 53 (1936) ; In re Simpson, 9
N.D. 379, 83 N.W. 541 (1900) ; 2 ARK. L. Rzv. 248 (1948).
51. A federal court disenrolled the prosecutor. Since the disenrollment evidenced
unprofessional conduct, the state court removed the prosecutor from office. Wilbur v.
Howard, supra note 50. The governor of Kentucky had tried to remove him from office
for misconduct but was unsuccessful. The court held that the constitutional means of
impeachment was the exclusive method for removing a public officer from office.
Commonwealth ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Howard, 297 Ky. 488, 180 S.W.2d 415 (1944). See
2 ARK. L. REv. 248 (1948) ; 15 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv. 217 (1947).
52. E.g., CONN. CoNsT. Art. IX, §3; LA. CoNsT. Art. 7, §1.
53. E.g., MIcH. CONsT. Art. IX, §7; N.Y. CoNsT. Art. 9, §5; MIcH. COMr. LAWS
§14.143 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §351.03 (West 1947).
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states, and conviction of a public officer for such an offense effects an
automatic removal from office.5 Consequently, a showing of misconduct
in office is sufficient not only to punish the prosecuting attorney, but
also to remove him from office. When the prosecutor acts with corrupt
intent, utilization of a criminal sanction to punish the violation is apt, and
removal from office is fully warranted. Since nonfeasance and mis-
feasance are usually indicative of the prosecutor's inability to perform
his duties adequately, removal from office for these reasons should be a
matter for the voters, not the courts.
Unfortunately, the duty to prosecute is seldom clear in any specific
instance. Nevertheless, a criminal action for nonfeasance in office has
been predicated upon an implied duty to prosecute.55 Although the
statute upon which the indictment was based does not differ materially
from those found in many states stipulating the general duties of the
prosecutor, the court interpreted it so as to require him to exercise dis-
cretion.6  Admittedly, this is not an outrageous demand ;17 however, the
court employed the reasonable man test to determine that an omission to
investigate a specific complaint indicated a failure to exercise any discre-
54. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 37, §.396 (1936); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-230 (1951);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§11116, 11119 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-17 (1943).
A brief discussion of these statutes and their general application may be found in 1
Bu nIcK, LAW OF CRIME §§272, 272a (1946). Generally, misconduct in office sufficient
to warrant indictment involves corrupt intent. United States v. Haas, 167 Fed. 211, 214
(1906) ; Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa.Super. 107, 120, 14 A.2d 907, 913 (1940).
Cf. Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 462, 198 S.W. 113, 115 (1917) ; State ex reL. Johnson v.
Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 43-44, 3 Pac. 534, 539 (1884). Contra, State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152,
175, 96 A.2d 63, 75 (1953).
55. Defendant, prosecuting attorney, was charged with wilful failure to perform
his duties by not using all reasonable means to detect and prosecute gambling violations,
though this duty was imposed upon him by law. The duty to investigate and prosecute
was implied from N.J. REv. STAT. §2:182-5 (1937), now N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:158-5
(Supp. 1951), which sets out the general duties of the prosecutor. This statute differs
from those mentioned in note 26, supra, only in the words, "he shall use all reasonable and
lawful diligence for the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against
the laws." Since this was a case of first impression, although enactment had occurred
55 years earlier, the court could have interpreted the statute to be subject to the general
discretion of the prosecutor as was the case when the law was passed. In fact, Oliphant,
J., took that position in dissenting. Instead, the court affixed an absolute duty on the
prosecutor to investigate each charge. Anything less exhibits lack of good faith, which,
the court says, is equivalent to bad faith and sufficient to uphold the conviction. State v.
Winne, supra note 54. One might question whether there is not a difference between "bad
faith" and "corrupt intent," even though the court says that it is not necessary to charge
the latter since that would be the same as malfeasance. Only New Jersey has asserted
that allegations of wilfulness or corruption are unnecessary to an indichnent for mis-
conduct in cases where intent has not been rendered superfluous by statute.
56. Id. at 174, 96 A.2d at 74. See note 55 supra.
57. Having elected a person to office and paid him reasonable compensation, the
public has a right to the exercise of his faculties because that exercise is precisely what
they bargained for and what the person agreed to give.
NOTES
tion.8 Under this interpretation, the prosecutor exercises personal judg-
ment at his peril, for his decision might not coincide with the conclusion
a reasonable man would reach under the same circumstances. Further-
more, it is an extremely difficult task to prove that discretion has been
exercised," whereas an allegation of indictable failure to act is easy to
make. Although the allegation must be proved in order to convict the
prosecutor of nonfeasance, such charges could be used to harass him at
politically, strategic times." Obviously, such a limitation obliterates the
many advantages to be gained from an unlimited, bona fide exercise
of discretion.
A final, extralegal control on the prosecutor's use of discretion in
the enforcement of the criminal laws is his personal relationship with
the public; the voting populace control his political fortunes, and private
clients contribute to his professional success. Even if official duties
require his complete attention, he is undoubtedly constantly aware of the
possibility of returning to private practice. This, of course, requires
clients, and they are apt to remember the manner in which he performed
the duties of his public office. Consequently, if his actions as a prose-
cutor antagonize the public, he will find expression of this in a loss of
votes and clients.
Absolute enforcement of all known violations of the criminal law
has never been attempted and, indeed, is seldom suggested because the
practical difficulties encountered in achieving the success of such a pro-
gram are insurmountable."' The alternative, discriminatory enforce-
ment. entails the exercise of discretion. Because of the nature of the
prosecutor's office, he is more aptly suited to exercise personal judgment
than any of the other agencies involved in criminal prosecution. 2 Ab-
solute, uncontrolled discretion in his hands, however, would delegate a
degree of power foreign to democratic theory and contrary to existing
58. "A county prosecutor within the orbit of his discretion inevitably has various
choices of action and even of inaction. This discretion applies as much to the seeking
of indictments from the grand jury as it does to prosecuting or recommending a nolle
prosequi after the indictment has been found, but he must at all times act in good faith
and exercise all reasonable and lawful diligence in every phase of his work." Id. at 174,
96 A.2d at 74.
59. An exercise of discretion which resulted in a decision not to prosecute would
be especially difficult to prove, even if the "proper investigation" test applied in State v.
Winne, id. at 174, 96 A.2d at 75, were used. In such a case, the sufficiency of the in-
vestigation would simply replace the exercise of discretion as the disputed issue.
60. Furthermore, the harassing tactics could be used with a degree of immunity
from retaliation. The courts frown upon the only legal remedy available to the prose-
cutor if he is so harassed: an action for malicious prosecution. See Watts v. Gerking,
111 Ore. 641, 656, 228 Pac. 135, 137 (1924).
61. See note 8 supra.
62. See p. 80 supra.
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law. Thus, the degree of latitude to be granted the prosecutor becomes
pertinent. The traditional restriction on the prosecutor's discretion, not
to exercise it with a corrupt intent, protects the public from the dishonest
official but not from the negligent or ignorant one.
If the prosecutor's discretion is further limited by the requirement
that it be exercised in a manner consistent with the standards of the
reasonable man test, the public is protected not only against the dishonest
prosecutor but also against the ignorant or negligent one. Unfortunately,
the price of the additional protection is too high, for all the advantages
presently accruing from the prosecutor's freedom of action are thereby
forfeited, especially the personal judgment most desired in an office
which demands selective use of time and talents. Since the ballot is
considered to be the most appropriate method for selecting capable gov-
ernment officials, it should offer adequate protection in this instance."5
If the prosecutor elects to omit prosecution when his judgment tells him
that the community would profit by it, the sanctions of disbarment and
removal from office, plus the loss of public approval and good will, should
induce him to act in the best interests of society.
HEARING EXAMINER STATUS: A RECURRENT PROBLEM IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The current controversy concerning the Civil Service Commission's
role in administering the hearing examiner program under Section 11 of
the Administrative Procedure Act1 points up what may be an inherent
weakness of this Act. This weakness is the concept of a semi-independent
hearing examiner which grew out of the recommendations of the Attor-
ney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941 and which
was substantially embodied by Congress in the APA in 1946.
Prior to the formation of the Attorney General's Committee formid-
able efforts were directed toward curbing the powers of administrative
63. "Neither lack of intellect, learning, nor even moral courage, in a prosecuting
attorney, judge or other elective officer, constitutes a disqualification to act officially,
and a judge would no more be justified in supplanting a prosecuting attorney for such
deficiency than would the latter be warranted in demanding a more learned, conscientious
and capable judge to hear the causes he must prosecute. The responsibility for lack of
capacity in officers must rest on the people who elected them." State ex rel. Williams v.
Ellis, 184 Ind. 307, 321, 112 N.E. 98, 103 (1915).
1. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952).
